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Paper Title:  The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight 
Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations  
 
Synopsis: 
 
This paper will summarize the thirty-year history of Space Shuttle operations 
from the perspective of training in NASA Johnson Space Center’s Mission 
Control Center. If will focus on training and development of flight controllers and 
instructors, and how training practices have evolved over the years as flight 
experience was gained, new technologies developed, as programmatic needs 
changed, and as the shuttle program is ending.  
 
Abstract: 
Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the 
training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring 
mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space 
Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and 
flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how 
training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple 
changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper 
will additionally give an overview of a flight control team’s makeup and 
responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained 
certified over the life span of the space shuttle.   
 
The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly 
over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained 
the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have 
evolved.  These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons 
learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational 
differences.  
 
A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by 
running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly “train 
like you fly.” The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a 
shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in 
training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human 
spaceflight endeavors.  
 
.   
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110004902 2019-08-30T14:20:40+00:00Z
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ABSTRACT 
 
Operation of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex; therefore, effective training and certification of 
operations personnel are critical for mission success. The Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at NASA’s Lyndon B. 
Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, manages mission operations for the Space Transportation System program, 
including training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 
2011, a comparison of STS-1 with STS-134 shows multiple changes shuttle flight controller training over a 30-year 
period. An overview of a flight control team’s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those 
teams have been trained and certified, also reveal important changes over the life span of the space shuttle. The 
training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core 
goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have 
evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors, including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, 
shifts in risk posture, and generational differences.  A primary method  used for training space shuttle flight control 
teams is mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, a practice that fully aligns the mission operations 
training with NASA’s “train like you fly, fly like you train” approach. A review of space shuttle training program 
lessons learned suggests how they could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For 30 years, NASA’s Space Transportation System 
(STS), also known as the shuttle program, has been the 
United States’ launch vehicle for the human spaceflight 
program. With the last shuttle launch on July 8, 2011, 
and with NASA exploring alternatives for future launch 
vehicles, it is timely to review and assess an essential 
aspect of the STS program: training and certification of 
operations personnel. 
 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the center for human 
spaceflight training, research, and flight control. The 
daily operation of the space shuttle is conducted at the 
JSC Mission Control Center (MCC) in Houston, Texas. 
The main task of an MCC is to manage space missions, 
from lift-off until the landing or the end of the mission. 
Flight controllers, flight crew, and other support 
personnel provide real-time support of all aspects of the 
mission including vehicle telemetry monitoring, 
commanding, mission planning and trajectory design. 
MCC personnel include operations subject matter 
experts of the attitude control system, power, 
propulsion, thermal, attitude dynamics, orbital 
operations and other subsystem disciplines (NASA 
2006). Each controller is an expert in a specific 
technical area, and is in constant communication with 
additional experts.  
 
Training and certification of operations personnel are 
critical elements in mission success. Training for these 
missions usually falls under the responsibility of 
dedicated training personnel. The flight controller and 
mission crew training typically includes extensive 
rehearsals in the MCC called simulations (also known 
as ”sims”). This paper provides a review of training 
methods and simulations developed over the 30-year 
shuttle program, as well as related lessons learned, that 
can help NASA plan for the next era of human 
spaceflight. 
 
 
TRAINING PRE-CHALLENGER 
Evolving Processes: from Workbooks to 
Simulations 
 
NASA began space shuttle flight controller training in 
the late 1970s, even before the first shuttle launch. This 
training involved a variety of tasks intended to build 
vehicle system expertise and core flight control skills, 
which had evolved from previous human spaceflight 
programs such as Gemini and Apollo (Case 1989). 
Because the shuttle design was not yet stable, shuttle 
operations practices were evolving rapidly, and flight 
controllers by necessity developed the operations 
documentation as they learned the systems. Early 
training primarily involved reading workbooks on 
different systems and pieces of hardware. Occasionally 
a flight controller would research a piece of hardware 
and present the findings to the group as a lecture. 
Office time was spent studying and working on 
operational documents to help the flight controller 
prepare for simulations (R. Dittemore, personal 
communication, April 4, 2011). Additionally, flight 
controllers developed and reviewed crew procedures, 
flight rules, system drawings, and malfunction 
procedures; these documents in turn became the 
primary training materials used in simulations. Flight 
controllers supported operations boards, project 
meetings, and program meetings. They coordinated, 
reviewed, and dispositioned the many weekly hardware 
and software changes. As basic console operations 
were established, console positions identified, and 
support positions staffed, the simulations revealed 
weaknesses in console operations that had to be fixed. 
Every day required attention to changes and 
preparation for future simulations. 
 
Shuttle flight simulations began approximately 1 year 
prior to the first launch (as originally scheduled in 
1978). However, as the launch was delayed several 
times, the STS-1 teams had several years and hundreds 
of hours of simulations prior to the actual launch (W. 
Hale, personal communication, May 10, 2011). 
Participants in these simulations involved staffed 
consoles that were connected to a vehicle simulator. 
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The simulations executed a piece of the mission 
timeline, procedures, and malfunctions. The 
malfunctions were inserted by instructors to evaluate 
flight controller performance. 
 
Ascent and entry teams conducted 6-hour simulations 
weekly to test the flight controllers on console. Flight 
phases were defined the same as they are today: The 
ascent phase of lift begins at liftoff and continues until 
the vehicle is in a safe low-Earth orbit (LEO) or until 
an abort landing is achieved. The orbit phase of flight 
begins after the vehicle is in a safe orbit and lasts until 
preparation for re-entry back to Earth. The entry phase 
of flight starts from the in-space de-orbit burn and ends 
with space shuttle touchdown (NASA 1988). The 
ascent and entry phases of flight require more training 
time because there is little time to make real-time 
decisions during these flight phases. In comparison, the 
orbit phase allows more time to make decisions 
because there is more time to look at potential failures 
or anomalies. As a result, less intense training is 
required for the orbit phase. 
 
Unlike today, there was no software to assist in 
decision making (R. Dittemore, personal 
communication, April 4, 2011). The information 
available was read from basic: displays of data and 
“advisory lights” that represented binary information; 
the operator had to identify and interpret the 
information quickly. These initial displays were based 
on Apollo telemetry requirements, and each display 
provided specific and limited insight. Multiple displays 
(data/plots) were needed to decipher and troubleshoot 
data. Console operations involved intensive data 
review, both real time and non–real time. During early 
missions, real-time telemetry was available for only 
brief periods of orbit time until the constellation of 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) was 
developed to provide nearly continuous data (T. 
Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011). 
 
From the beginning, instructors developed simulations 
to “stretch” the console operators’ knowledge and to 
identify weaknesses in procedures, rules, and mission 
plan. Simulations explored the way the flight system 
truly behaved, which sometimes differed from the 
original intentions of the spacecraft designers. The 
degree of difficulty varied depending upon the 
simulation objectives; operators could not be certified 
unless they were able to handle the full range of 
scenarios (W. Hale, personal communication, May 10, 
2011). The instructors also developed simulations that 
would stress the hardware and software system to help 
the team understand how the system would react in 
specific flight phases.  
These simulations also uncovered issues that vehicle 
testing and certification had missed. For example, in an 
April 19, 1999 simulation, the Back Up Flight (BFS) 
software took control of the space shuttle as planned, 
but an unexpectedly high pitch rate resulted. The 
vehicle pitched up over 360 degrees before operators 
could regain control. The simulation was rerun several 
times and the problem was reproduced. This BFS issue 
was corrected, and simulation data validated this 
change. Failures were welcome, as they indicated that 
the simulation hardware and software sufficiently 
stressed the system. “Crashes” were common in early 
simulations and sometimes the simulation efficacy was 
questionable. Simulations evolved and became more 
complex as the systems and software were better 
understood. As in any integrated system, the software 
was the most difficult part of the equation, with heavy 
demands on time, effort, and resources (R. Dittemore, 
personal communication, April 4, 2011).  
 
Although simulation schedules varied in the 1970s, 
simulations were usually held once or twice a week to 
accommodate the continuous systems development. By 
1983, simulations were being held every day because 
the simulator had been sufficiently developed to handle 
the rigors of a daily run (Torres 2002). Additionally, 
the mission manifest had grown, and more certified 
individuals were needed in a variety of positions to 
support multiple missions. 
 
Training and Certification Standards 
 
At the beginning of the shuttle program and into the 
late 1980s, there were no set standards for training or 
certification. In addition to there being no set standards 
for training, there was no minimum number of 
simulations required for certification Controllers 
studied the systems, developed documentation, and 
participated in simulations to learn how to operate the 
shuttle (T. Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 
2011). 
The basic qualifications for flight controllers were 
talent and skill in communication, failure recognition, 
and leadership, as well as an ability to handle the fast 
pace and stress of the operations environment. The 
flight controllers were evaluated on seven main 
categories. Mission cognizance deals with maintaining 
awareness of the shuttle vehicle configuration and 
prioritizing discipline activities. Systems knowledge 
deals with understanding how to maintain and operate 
the vehicle efficiently with respect to current 
conditions. Problem recognition and resolution tests the 
knowledge of the existence of a problem, and the 
ability to diagnose and develop multiple solution 
options along with appropriate rationale. Console 
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management testing involves understanding the limits 
of the console tools and appropriate use during 
different phases of flight. Communication is evaluated 
on timeliness of response, clarity, proactivness, and 
accuracy. Team management involves the trainee’s 
ability to accept or give direction, balance work load, 
and prioritize team tasks. Attitude/effort assesses the 
trainee’s honesty, how he or she deals with difficult 
situations, and whether or not full effort is made.  
 
Mission-specific simulations are conducted each flight 
to allow the crew and flight control teams to practice 
various parts of the mission timeline before a flight. 
These mission-specific simulations are very different 
from generic training simulations. The generic 
simulations are filled with multiple malfunctions to test 
and train uncertified flight controllers. Initially, flight 
controllers were trained in generic simulations for 
“backroom” positions—system-specific experts 
responsible for the details of their assigned systems. 
The backroom in the mission control room is called the 
multi-purpose support room (MPSR). The backroom 
positions (MPSR) were the training positions used to 
first introduce the operations principles to new hires 
and new console operators. The expectation was that, 
as personnel learned more about shuttle operations, 
they would move to front control room (FCR) 
positions, responsible for appropriately integrating their 
systems’ requirements with other system operators 
(NASA 1988). Additionally, the FCR position was 
responsible for providing a plan, operational changes, 
and recommendations to the Flight Director (T. 
Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011)..  
 
When a controller finished the training for a certain 
position, a final evaluation simulation was scheduled. 
In the final evaluation for certification, the individual 
was presented with multiple failures and complex 
situations. The final simulation was a onetime case with 
more failures than would occur in real time operations 
or generic simulations. These evaluations were 
conducted by senior experienced flight controllers. If in 
the judgment of the senior flight controllers the trainees 
performed well and met the category objectives listed 
above, they were considered to be certified. Over time, 
evaluation criteria were established for certification, 
and evaluators would formally assess each candidate 
against these criteria to complete the certification 
process. Many controllers came up with their own ways 
to recall information on console. For example, some 
controllers developed a set of “cue cards” that helped 
them remember specific flight phase characteristics, 
timelines, and other critical information. As more and 
more people developed individual sets, the operations 
team identified the best cue cards, which were 
formalized and became part of the training (R. 
Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011).  
 
 
TRAINING IMPROVEMENTS IN THE 1990s 
 
There were many catalysts for change in the shuttle 
operations environment: lessons learned from 
experience and adjusted practices accordingly, software 
improvements provided greater details into down 
linked data from the shuttle, operations moved to a new 
control center, and the two space shuttle accidents 
initiated changes in every aspect of shuttle operations.  
 
After the Challenger Accident 
 
After the Challenger accident in 1987, there was a 
down period for training simulations. The Challenger 
accident resulted in an in-depth review of all flight 
phases, procedures, and flight rules. Additional flight 
rules were written and procedures were revised, with 
the result that the simulations became more complex. 
The review period allowed time for a more formal 
training process to be formulated. Development started 
on a training guide, today called the “blue book,” and 
detailed training flows were created. Instructor-led 
technical classes were created to supplement the 
workbooks, with topics ranging from hardware to crew 
procedures. Shuttle onboard software was updated to 
be more efficient and help with failure scenarios ( 
T.Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011). 
Additional desktop computers were also added to the 
MCC to augment display data (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  1980s-era MCC 
 
The transition to a new MCC facility (Figure 2) 
occurred in the mid 1990s. The control center provided 
new hardware and software, with an increase in the 
number of available displays, communication 
resources, data availability, playback, and data 
charting. Communication panels changed from back 
lighted mechanical push buttons to programmable 
touch screens (NASA 1988). Display capability was 
greatly increased. Instead of data from a few screens, 
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each flight controller could access many software 
programs showing data. This additional data insight 
made failure diagnosis much easier.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Current MCC 
 
Training for shuttle flight controllers continued in the 
previously described manner until the 1990s, when 
training was formalized to accommodate an influx of 
shuttle flight controllers. The blue book created for 
each subsystem streamlined the training process. In 
addition, new technology was brought into the training 
process. Computers became more readily available; no 
longer did five or more people share one computer. 
Shuttle mock ups, called single-system trainers (SST), 
had been created in the early 1980s to help controllers 
understand what the astronauts were doing as the 
controllers executed certain procedures. The SSTs 
contained computer databases with software allowing 
students to interact with controls and displays like those 
of a shuttle crew station. This was a significant 
contribution to training at the time, but it was not until 
the 1990s that the SST software was made available at 
the controllers’ individual computers. Also in the 
1990s, more computer-based training was being 
introduced to the flight controllers. An additional 
improvement was creation of a flight controller trainer 
(FCT), a mini mission control room that could be used 
to teach failure recognition. The FCT was also used to 
train multiple operations personnel as if they were 
working in the mission control room together (Cooper 
1987).  
 
As the shuttle training program matured, it took longer 
for people to become certified. Over the course of the 
program, the number of simulations required to certify 
each person increased steadily.   It is unclear why this is 
so, since one might predict that certification would take 
less time as shuttle operations practices matured. One 
possibility is that the problem resolution and systems 
knowledge certification requirements continued to 
expand as more became known about the system, with 
increased complexity of procedures and rules. It 
became very difficult for some systems disciplines to 
reduce the certification requirements, even after flying 
the shuttles for 20 years. Some failures were being 
simulated without full understanding of how the system 
might perform, as if the shuttle were still in the early 
stages of development. It is also possible that 
certification expectations varied by position and even 
by person, with evaluators for some positions being 
more determined than others to identify a rigorous set 
of certification requirements (R. Dittemore, personal 
communication, April 4, 2011. 
 
When the shuttle program was initiated in 1972, flight 
controllers needed to be certified quickly to 
accommodate NASA’s original goal of 8 to 12 flights 
per year. The flight controllers learned a great deal 
during the first few shuttle flights. The shuttle 
capabilities and operating characteristics were 
continually under test. New information was acquired 
with each launch. Certification time (measured both in 
the number of simulations completed and in calendar 
time) was less than what it was in the latter half of the 
shuttle program. This conclusion is based on historical 
data collected by the Mission Operations Directorate; 
Table 1 shows examples of these data for the mid-
1990s through 2007. One can see a significant increase 
in simulations needed to certify from the early dates in 
each table until the last input in each table. The factors 
mentioned above may have been factors as well. The 
amount of time spent by personnel in training was 
deemed to be a problem for staffing future missions. 
Recommendations were made and implemented, but the 
training time was not affected. 
 
After the Columbia Accident 
 
There were more training program changes after the 
Columbia accident in 2003. For the 10 years prior to 
the Columbia accident, the shuttle program budget had 
been steadily decreasing, with corresponding impacts 
on all organizations funded by the shuttle program 
office. Some items were not approved or were not built 
due to cost. This situation was created in part because 
of the space station program. The space station was 
being built with no increase in the NASA budget, 
which meant cuts in other agency programs to fund the 
station. Without the necessary funding, improvements 
to flight controller training could not be implemented. 
After the Columbia accident, there were no simulations 
for several weeks. Once the simulations were started up 
again, the schedule became very busy. Multiple 
simulations were being held each day. Long simulations 
that simulated multiple flight days became more 
prevalent in training. This increase in simulations was 
viewed as a way to increase safety by the Columbia 
accident investigation review board. If the console 
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teams trained more, then they would be better prepared 
to handle a problem that occurred during the mission 
(W. Hale, personal communication, May 10, 2011).  
 
New standards were established to set simulation 
difficulty ratings and to define the maximum number of 
simulations allowed prior to certification, along with a 
difficulty rating for each simulation. The difficulty 
rating  of the simulations was on a scale of high, 
medium or low was based on the number of selected 
failures and actions during the simulations A threshold 
level was established for each subsystem, based on the 
historical average number of simulations needed to 
certify personnel within the previous 5 years. This 
numerical value is not consistent from group to group.  
If a console operator did not complete certification 
within the threshold, his or her group leader could 
appeal to management for additional simulation 
opportunities. The management team would then 
determine the additional number of simulations that 
would be allocated for the console operator to show 
improvement before another final certification 
simulation would be scheduled for the individual. At 
the end of the simulation, the number of 
scenarios/failures that occurred during the simulation 
determined the rating assigned to the simulation. Below 
in Table 2 are the levels of scenarios/failures that 
determined the difficulty rating for each simulation.  
 
Simulation Ranking Number of criteria 
Low 0-7 criteria marked 
Medium 8-14 criteria marked 
High 15 or more criteria 
marked 
Table 2: Simulation Ranking Information Criteria 
Results have shown that these changes have helped 
decrease certification time over the last few years of the 
space shuttle program. 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Many factors led to improvements in shuttle operator 
training: advances in technology, an expanding 
manifest with concurrent need for more efficient 
training methods, experience gained from shuttle 
accidents, and the operations experience gained by 
completing over one hundred missions. The following 
are lessons learned that have been identified by the 
Mission Operations Directorate. The corresponding 
recommendations are proposed by the authors, based 
on interviews and discussions with senior operators.  
 
Skills: Effective certification requires that individual 
flight controllers have the appropriate capabilities. 
 
In the early shuttle program, the skill set was evolving 
along with the maturity of the shuttle itself.  It was not 
unusual for flight controllers to be selected based on 
engineering capabilities that were not directly 
applicable to operations requirements. Over the life of 
the shuttle program, there are many examples of 
individuals who left the Mission Operations Directorate 
for other jobs. This in most cases was due to a lack of 
skills needed to perform on console. There are no data 
to document this, but it is axiomatic in the flight 
controller working environment. 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Simulations required to certify one flight controller in each of several groups (1995–2007) 
Year Certification 
Completed 
Number of Simulations 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
1995  22     
1996 40      
1997  17 31    
1998 74 66    37 
1999  39 74  31 38 
2000  85  33 47 48 
2001 41  66 45  22 
2002 21 46  69 107 50 
2003  43 23    
2004 181 119 60  123  
2005 157  44    
2006   40 55  58 
2007   68 57   
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Feedback: Continuous constructive feedback is 
essential to flight controller success. 
 
If a flight controller is not receiving the necessary 
feedback, then he or she do not know how or what to 
improve. This feedback job falls primarily on the group 
lead, who must make sure that the individual is 
progressing at the proper rate, and that the employee is 
receiving the right amount of feedback and 
encouragement.  
 
A no-cost solution to the controller feedback issue is to 
have more group leads or senior flight controllers 
observing trainees on every other simulation and 
provide real-time oral feedback. Feedback can be given 
on a regular basis and bad habits resolved more 
quickly.  In addition, give written feedback within three 
days after each certification simulation. This has 
historically not been done by some group leads and 
would be a role change for that job title. 
 
Training Strategy: Training of the flight controllers 
needs to be done efficiently. 
 
The years of not flying after the Columbia accident 
contributed to a change in the training strategy. The 
number of simulations was increased after the accident 
as a way to ensure more expertise and decision making 
from the console teams. Additionally, the training 
strategy required that each flight controller had to see 
every failure that could occur. This led to issues with 
scheduling “the right” failures in specific simulations. 
The simulations are scripted to address a specific test 
objective that the flight controller has to resolve. 
Normally there might be one or two failures per system 
in a noncertification simulation. Scheduling issues 
contributed as well to the length of time it took to 
certify.  The organization attempted to solve this by 
creating ranking systems for simulations of high, 
medium, or low content. Only the high or medium 
simulations counted against the individual in the 
training flow. This approach was started in 2007 and 
has been in place since that time. The amount of 
simulations varies on who needs to accomplish certain 
objectives and what positions need to be certified prior 
to flight.  
 
Another impact of long certification times is employee 
morale.  Sometimes there would be two or three people 
waiting in a flow for a turn to get certified. It could take 
several years to even start taking simulations. This was 
frustrating for new hires and trainees right out of 
college. Then taking a year or longer to get a 
certification added to the frustration; employees had 
difficulty seeing a reasonable opportunity to advance 
their careers.  In some cases the frustration could cause 
poor performance in the employee’s daily work. These 
issues might drive away qualified employees. That is 
not true for all cases; some individuals love the work 
and are committed to it no matter how long it takes to 
advance. 
 
One solution would be to use simulation technology at 
each employee’s workstation. Currently there is a 
Flight Controller Trainer (FCT) available to teach a 
class, usually once per week per trainee. The FCT is a 
workstation that is used to introduce malfunctions to 
new trainees; this amount of FCT usage is not enough 
to decrease certification time. An interactive software 
program for the trainee’s office workstation might 
decrease certification time (Loftin 1989). This software 
program would model failures, give options for 
solutions, and show the impact of the solution path 
selected. This would allow more access and training 
every day in the office and not require as much time in 
the control room. The cost to develop the tool is less 
than the cost of running hundreds of simulation. Time 
would be needed to develop the tool, but that is 
available at the end of the shuttle program. Technology 
is readily available to do this and could be done by 
private industry. This would help create a working 
relationship in the private training world.  
 
Another recommendation is to revert back to 
certification of individuals who have not seen every 
failure of a system; in this approach, a trainee does not 
need a “check in every box” to be certified—a method 
that would definitely drive down certification time. 
However, the data has not been analyzed that addresses 
the likelihood of success if trainees to not see every 
failure, so a significant concern is that it could increase 
the risk that a certified flight controller is not fully 
qualified. If this recommendation is accepted, questions 
on qualification need to address failure recognition and 
resolution, and need to prove whether or not the trainee 
has the skills to support likely failure scenarios. 
Additionally, the interactive workstation software 
program discussed above could help cover some of the 
failures not seen by the individual. This would 
additionally reduce the cost as associated with many 
simulations needed by multiple individuals. 
 
Cost/Certification Time: In NASA’s cost- sensitive 
environment, money is a huge driver. 
 
The more simulations that were conducted by the 
operations organization the more cost the shuttle 
program incurred. In the years before the Columbia 
accident, cost conservation was more a concern. After 
the accident, cost was not the top concern; returning 
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safely to flight was the top priority of the NASA 
leadership.  Simulations were being run twice a day and 
during the day and night. Long simulations again were 
started up. Although these accounted for increased cost, 
they were viewed as necessary to ensure safety.   
 
As more flights were added to the manifest prior to the 
shuttle accidents, more people were hired. This created 
a back log in multiple groups for training. People were 
waiting their turn to get simulations.  One easy way to 
reduce cost is to reduce personnel. This not a popular 
topic with many people, but is a valid solution to 
reduce cost. This could be done by combining groups, 
which would allow responsibilities to be shared and 
encourage individuals to learn multiple skill sets, 
thereby increasing efficiency and reducing costs. In the 
past MOD has tried this concept. This was done in the 
early shuttle program with the Avionics console 
position. A temporary combination of EECOM and 
EGIL positions was done, but was not made permanent 
due to the demands placed on the one position. The 
International Space Station (ISS) console operators 
have implemented this concept as well for some of their 
flight controller positions. The results have proven to 
be effective by reducing staff and positions needed to 
manned. Private industry has successfully used this 
approach over the last several years: Companies had to 
lay off individuals to cut costs, and the remaining 
workers had to assume additional roles and 
responsibilities. These leaner companies run much 
more efficiently and generate larger revenues. While 
NASA is not interested in revenues, it is very interested 
in controlling and reducing costs. 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has a problem 
similar to NASA with respect to cost. The DoD budget 
for fiscal year 2011 was decreased and will most likely 
be further reduced in FY 2012. However, the cost to 
operate and launch their solid rocket vehicles increases 
each year. The training efficiencies identified by NASA 
for their next-era launch vehicle can benefit DoD and 
other agencies as well, which will help other agencies 
keep within increasingly tightened budgets. 
 
Technology: The use of technology can aide in the 
reduction of cost. 
 
Another lesson learned is the degree to which 
technology development can affect operations. The 
costs associated with limited data availability in the 
original shuttle mission control were reduced when 
flight controllers moved to the1990s’ control center 
with its then state-of-the-art technology. That 
technology has since become dated and obsolete; in the 
new space vehicle development era, there are 
opportunities to explore a variety of mission control 
room models. Some companies suggest that a trailer 
filled with computers and operators would be sufficient. 
Others look to the models used by satellite operations 
controllers. Another model incorporates the large 
control rooms and teams used by the shuttle and space 
station. There are benefits and drawbacks to each of 
these options. In the current environment, with cost 
being the greatest driver, it appears that the technology 
that gives NASA the most capability, flexibility, and 
lowest cost is the preferred option. Currently, the 
Mission Operations Directorate is building a new MCC 
and training System capability to apply state of the art 
technology and achieve these efficiencies  
 
Technology is our greatest opportunity to ensure 
success as we go forward in the space program.  It will 
help reduce cost by eliminating some of the work done 
today by people—just as it did when the shuttle 
program transitioned from the old to the new control 
center. Many commercial companies are trying to find 
the balance of new technology, minimal operations 
teams, and small control rooms. While NASA is not-
for-profit, the agency can learn from the for-profit 
companies’ efforts to achieve the optimum balance; 
however, NASA also must learn from history how to 
balance technology and cost.  
 
Consider the example of the airline industry in the 
1930s. At that time there were many fledging airline 
carriers being formed. There were no operating 
standards, and many accidents occurred and people 
were killed. It was not until 1935, when an airline 
accident killed a sitting U.S. senator that questions 
were raised about safety. Eventually operating 
standards were created and these eventually led to the 
creation of what we know today as the Federal Aviation 
Administration. We can see that one accident of 
importance can change the industry and bring 
regulations and add process; and, of course, the 
improvements are likely to add cost and time to 
production. This happened in the space program after 
the Challenger and Columbia accidents, and could 
happen again in the revenue-conscious for-profit 
environment. One accident from one of the commercial 
companies can bring unwanted scrutiny, which in turn 
could result in expensive requirements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the 30-year space shuttle program, NASA has had 
many opportunities to improve flight controller training 
and certification. As the shuttle program comes to a 
close, the replacement vehicle is yet to be selected or 
designed. The uncertain future provides an opportunity 
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to start over and reevaluate the flight controller training 
process. A review of the evolving STS certification 
requirements, the data collected and the lessons learned 
suggest recommendations that establish a foundation 
for developing an effective training program for the 
next space transportation vehicle. Although we do not 
now know what requirements the new launch vehicle 
will place on mission operations, the shuttle-related 
recommendations are likely to be relevant in the post-
shuttle environment; in particular, the need to address 
challenges related to cost is likely to remain. 
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